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2 
Introduction 
 
 
There is much to suggest that by the end of 
2007 or in the first quarter of 2008 the 
administration in Washington shall conclude 
(separate) negotiations with Polish and Czech 
governments over the construction in southwest 
Poland of an antimissile base, and of the 
system’s radiolocation station close to Prague. 
Together, they would constitute one of three 
launch sites being built as an integral part of the 
American Missile Defence (MD) system.1 
In accepting the American installation on their 
territory Poland and its southern neighbour will 
be making a strategic decision which may bear 
significantly on their foreign, security and 
defence policies. The United States concluded 
that Poland and Czech Republic are the best 
available location for elements of the system 
which, according to American data, defend not 
only the USA, but also Poland, Czech Republic 
and a significant portion of our continent against 
missile attacks originating in the Middle and Far 
East. 
The construction of sites in Poland and Czech 
Republic would commence soon (preparations 
are underway), and end sometime around 
2010/2011. When exactly the final decision will 
be made to conclude bilateral talks depends on 
certain domestic political factors in the United 
States,2 but also, increasingly, on the situation in 
                                                          
1 Citations in the present text shall contain several different 
names and acronyms designating the project, given the 
evolution of its essence and terminology in the United 
States, beginning with the Global Missile Defence (GMD) 
system, through National Missile Defence (NMD), to MD, 
with the notion of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) also 
frequently evoked. 
2 Following American Congressional elections in November 
last year, the balance of power in the US Congress shifted, 
indicating an increased likelihood of the opposition 
Democrats to come out on top in the upcoming presidential 
poll. According to high ranking Polish diplomats, the current 
administration wants to advance work on the system prior to 
Poland whose political landscape after the 
October 21 general election remains uncertain 
as this is being written.3 Consultations with 
Poland over the missile shield have been in 
progress since 2002, with varying intensity, 
though the Americans made their official offer in 
May 2006. In late 2004 the Polish government 
issued directive no. 117, setting up units within 
the Foreign and Defence ministries to consider 
whether and in what way Poland ought to 
participate in the American venture. On May 24 
2007 the United States despatched an official 
invitation to open negotiations with Poland. 
Witold Waszczykowski, undersecretary of state 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became head 
of the Polish negotiators, with John Rood, US 
Assistant Secretary of State, leading the 
American team. 
Launch pads housing 104 interceptor missiles 
(GBI, Ground-Based Interceptors), which may 
be located on Polish territory would constitute 
the third of the most important components of 
the system commonly known as the antimissile 
shield. Since October 2004 the United States 
has been deploying interceptors in nine silos on 
its own territory: in Fort Greely, Alaska, and in 
California’s Vandenberg base, with radar 
support from a site in Alaska, as well as Pacific 
based destroyers and cruisers outfitted with the 
AEGIS detection, tracking, target discrimination 
                                                                                       
Republicans’ possibly losing control of the White House. Cf. 
The Republican Party’s electoral platform at 
http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf and 
http://www.gop.com/Issues/SafetyAndSecurity. For the 
Democrats’ stance see 
http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf. 
3 As a result, Washington has announced detailed 
consultations with parties which remain in opposition in the 
run-up to polling day, aware of the fact that Poland may wish 
to bid up the price for its accepting the deployment of the 
American system. 
4 The number reflects American estimates as to how many 
rockets are necessary to disable 3-4 missiles fired from, say, 
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and engagement system and SM-3 missiles. All 
these elements are integrated with command 
centres in Colorado, Nebraska, Hawaii and 
Washington, DC. The system’s core is 
supplemented with various ancillary elements, 
permitting different configurations, including, in 
principle, cooperation with America’s allies, both 
within NATO and outside that bloc. 
Set to take shape gradually over several 
decades, the system can be described as a 
multilayered network of subsystems capable—
given its proper functioning—of destroying 
ballistic missiles in different flight stages (boost, 
ballistic and re-entry), irrespective of where they 
were launched. The Polish site would permit 
“knocking out” missiles in the ballistic stage, i.e. 
in space, some 150-200 km above ground. 
Measuring just under twenty metres, the rockets 
deployed in southwest Poland would be 
equipped not with nuclear warheads but with 
kinetic energy interceptors, surface to air 
missiles each weighing about 75 kilograms. 
Thus, response to a strike—hypothetically 
involving Iranian Shabab-3, Shabab-4 or 
Shabab-5 missiles with a range of 2500-3000 
kilometres—would be conventional.5 
Ultimately, existing or future elements, be they 
fixed or mobile, ground-, sea-, air- or space-
based (radars, antimissiles, lasers, 
communications and command infrastructure) 
would be integrated into a single system 
defending US territory, the country’s forces and 
military bases beyond its borders, as well as its 
                                                                                       
Iran’s territory, which that country would be able to launch in 
foreseeable future. 
5 Hostile rockets may be hit head on or side on. According to 
brigadier general Patrick O’Reilly, deputy director of MDA, 
the kinetic energy released on contact is so great that the 
resultant heat obliterates approximately 25 percent of the 
warhead, with the remainder burning out on re-entry into the 
atmosphere. Some fragments may possibly reach the 
surface. 
allies’ territory and armies (including beyond 
their borders). There are plans for some one 
hundred silos armed with rockets capable of 
disabling missiles coming in from all possible 
directions. Despite the fiasco of certain tests 
conducted to verify the system’s effectiveness,6 
since late 2004 the Americans have been 
redoubling their technical efforts, focusing on 
defence of US territory.  One of the MD system’s 
more important, even crucial premises—also 
from the Polish perspective—is the fact that it is 
to constitute an integral part of a future defence 
mechanism that would protect the USA itself.  
The most clear-cut argument in favour of 
Poland’s accepting a strategically significant 
component of American military infrastructure is 
the desire to neutralize potential threats, albeit 
not necessarily from distant states such as Iran 
or North Korea, but ones which may arise 
relatively close to our eastern borders, though it 
remains moot whether, and to what extent, the 
United  
States also anticipate such a threat. One can 
only speculate whether in future the system will 
be capable of intercepting hostile rockets 
homing in on Polish territory from the east, and 
this appears to be the subject of some serious 
discussion between Poland and the USA. 
The decision regarding the deployment of 
elements of the American shield will be 
significantly influenced by specifically Polish 
thinking in geopolitical terms. At issue is 
securing additional—besides NATO 
guarantees—assurance against threats. Poland 
has been reiterating the argument that locating 
shield components on our territory, though not 
                                                          
6 Since 2001, a total of 35 test have been conducted with 27 
successes, i.e. direct hits by the antimissiles in the ballistic 
or re-entry stage. 
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aimed at Russia, would nonetheless possess 
“deterrent” value. For instance, the daily 
“Rzeczpospolita” quoted general Stanisław 
Koziej, renowned military strategist and former 
deputy defence minister, as saying that “if we 
agree to participate in the antimissile shield, 
Putin will think a hundred times before deciding 
to strike Poland.”7 This claim illustrates that the 
purpose of and justification for Polish 
involvement in this initiative does not derive 
solely from the latter’s role in and intercepting 
missiles belonging to “rogue” states, but 
possibly also from more direct threats to 
Poland’s defence and security. 
At the outset, any analysis of the antimissile 
shield’s importance to Poland must allow that: 
‐ The shape and assumptions of the 
project, were it to be implemented, are 
constantly subject to evolution, 
depending on external and internal 
political or military conditions in the 
United States, and on modifications to 
its actual structure, its technical 
parameters and financial 
considerations. This means that in 
advance it is impossible to aptly and 
unequivocally assess the interrelations 
between MD, American engagement in 
European—and specifically, Polish—
affairs, and our security at each phase 
in the project’s development. Therefore 
perceptions thereof may easily lead to 
certain misunderstandings; 
‐ Ultimately, the system is supposed to 
protect America’s allies, though its initial 
and absolute priority is to defend the 
territory and interests of the United 
                                                          
7 Rzeczpospolita, April 11, 2006. 
States. As such, it is difficult to claim 
that in the foreseeable future the system 
could be used to defend Polish territory 
in any direct manner, though the 
Americans insist that MD is to protect 
Poland. However, system elements 
located on Polish territory could deter, 
or—according to others—attract a 
hostile strike. Still, its integral link to the 
US national defence system may 
suggest that it would indirectly augment, 
rather than diminish Polish security. 
 
Given the American antimissile system’s 
importance to the global dimension of 
international relations in the long term, 
cooperating with the United States would entail 
lasting implications, both positive and negative, 
for our country’s defence and security. However, 
the question of whether or not building shield 
elements on Polish territory is justified has not 
as yet received a clear answer. 
Poland faces its most important decision since 
entering NATO in 1999 and sending troops to 
Iraq (2003), and the first permanent deployment 
of foreign forces on its territory since Russian 
withdrawal in 1983 (though admittedly, the 
American’s minimal numbers and disparate 
political role make any comparisons gratuitous). 
In agreeing to deploy elements of the shield 
(and President Lech Kaczyński’s assertion that 
this is “practically settled” may be treated as 
evidence of such agreement)8 would be making 
a strategic choice—both due to the nature of the 
planned installations, which are to facilitate the 
overriding and universal task before 
contemporary security policy, to wit combating 
                                                          
8 Dziennik, July 17, 2007. 
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terrorism with missile-based weapons, as well 
as to the repercussions of tying its security with 
that of America in much more direct a way than 
through NATO. Author of one analysis aptly 
noted that “the final decision on this issue will 
constitute a strategic choice which shall 
determine Poland’s future place on the 
international arena, shape its relations with the 
United States, European partners within NATO 
and the EU, and with its eastern neighbours. 
The type and range of consequences that 
Poland will bear as a result of participating in the 
shield project will primarily depend on the 
content of American proposals and on whether 
Poland’s role in the system shall be active or 
passive, and if the former, then to what extent.”9 
In any event, it ought to be borne in mind that 
pulling out of a project which has already 
entered implementation stage would be difficult 
to imagine, for political and military-technical 
reasons. At the same time there is always the 
possibility that the American antimissile system, 
currently still in test phase, will not see the light 
of day—at least not in the shape being 
discussed and constructed today, the more so 
given that Congress and House of 
Representatives are cutting funding for MD10—
will turn out to be flawed or ineffective. 
In its own right antimissile defence is generally 
deemed a promising solution to the problem of 
security guarantees for particular countries, 
regions and armed forces stationed in various 
areas. Thus, it ought to be treated as the most 
crucial strategic issue for the upcoming 
decades. In their security strategies, major 
international organizations have named the risk 
                                                          
9 Katarzyna Hołdak, “Amerykański system obrony 
przeciwrakietowej i jego implikacje dla Polski”, 
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 1 – 2006/, Wydawnictwo BBN. 
of terrorist attack using missile-based weapons 
of mass destruction as the greatest—and 
universal—threat facing the global community. 
This danger has increased to the degree where 
in the foreseeable future countries now in 
possession of rockets and propulsion systems 
capable of firing them as far as 1,000-2,000 km 
may well acquire weapons with the range of 
approximately 3,000-4,000 or even 5,000 km 
and more. Such missiles will be more accurate 
and able to carry warheads equipped with 
various types of weapons of mass destruction. 
Extended range of ballistic missiles should 
become the starting point for deliberations over 
the purposefulness of participating in defence 
programmes which may permit shooting down a 
hostile rocket in a situation where both it and the 
antimissile are hurtling at each other at a speed 
of several kilometres per second. 
According to estimates,11 over 30 countries or 
groups with terrorist links now dispose of rockets 
of varying range, but of ever improving design. It 
is unlikely that at this stage Poland is threatened 
by such states or organizations, and so some 
people question the credibility of the argument 
that our country needs to defend itself against 
similar rocket threats, for instance from Iran. 
However, one cannot entirely preclude this 
possibility in the long run. Poland’s 2003 
“National Security Strategy”  states that “a 
number of countries are working on the 
construction of weapons of mass destruction 
and rocket systems which may, over the next 
few years, result in Polish territory’s falling into 
range of ballistic missiles from outside of 
Europe. This threat is increasing due to the ever 
more real possibility of such weapons falling into 
                                                                                       
10 To approx. 600 mn dollars. 
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the hands terrorist of criminal organizations.”12 
This observation13 may serve as the formal 
premise to justify the decision on the shield. 
Were one to assume—and this appears to be 
the only rational option—that Poland ought not 
to isolate itself from the mainstream of 
international security policy, then from this 
perspective it could be claimed that, despite 
multifarious unknowns and provisos related to 
the MD project in its political and military 
aspects, Poland should lean towards 
participation in the American project, on 
favourable terms. As matters stand NATO and 
EU projects, still in embryonic phase, do not 
represent a viable alternative. 
Given that details of the talks with the USA, the 
exact location (somewhere in the vicinity of 
Słupsk) and terms of the “Polish” MD 
component’s deployment, and other relevant 
data have hitherto not been disclosed, any 
potential arguments for or against also appear 
relative, at best. 
 
Security above all 
 
The most general, but at the same time 
overriding question is whether, and to what 
extent would locating an element of the 
American system constitute value added to 
Polish security as it stands at present (or as it is 
likely to stand the nearest future). Formulated in 
this manner, the query needs no additional 
justification. For any country, external security is 
a value in itself. The obverse of this question is 
                                                                                       
11 Cf. Subsequent editions of the SIPRI Yearbook. 
12 
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?strona=pl_dokument_strategia_bezpi
eczenstwa. 
13 Work is in progress on the new Strategy. 
how great is the risk that our security shall be 
diminished. 
Poland’s decision to allow (or disallow) the 
installation of the American antimissile shield to 
proceed should be based on an objective 
analysis of arguments in favour and those 
against. However, in making it Poland ought 
also to take heed that ever since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, through the 
successful process of negotiating NATO 
membership, engagement in Iraq and finally EU 
accession, it has founded its security interests 
principally on cooperation with the United 
States. 
For now this trend persists—irrespective of 
whether the USA is viewed as an autonomous 
agent, as NATO member with the greatest 
political and military clout, or as the leading 
force within a coalition of different states. 
Whatever the interpretation, the glaring 
asymmetry of power and import between the 
United States and Poland engenders a certain 
political and military dependence. Today, Poland 
seems willing to accept this in the name of 
increased security guarantees (which politicians 
frequently do not try and hide, some even 
expressing the desire for Poland to be treated 
as the USA’s  special partner). 
However, a change in its political landscape 
may provoke Poland to re-examine its approach 
to the United States—the more so given that so 
far in the negotiation process Washington has 
not made any explicit promises (at least to 
Polish public opinion) that could be construed as 
indication of strengthened security guarantees. 
This re-examination may take the form of certain 
reserve towards the USA. Presumably, 
deploying the antimissile system in Poland 
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without prior political and defence agreement 
would fail to win parliamentary approval—either 
before or after the October 21 election. Thus, 
agreement with the USA may well not be subject 
to ratification, but shall instead be adopted in 
another form. Yet that could leave unanswered 
the question of what needs to be done, and 
how, to ensure that in dislocating an antimissile 
base on Polish territory the United States does 
not treat our country instrumentally—simply as a 
good place to site its own defence system—but 
actually commits  itself to supporting Poland’s 
national defence system. 
Before the most significant elements of the MD 
system are deployed on its territory, Poland 
needs to realize that this favours the 
development of American power—and ultimately 
its supremacy—on a global scale, with all the 
attendant positive, negative and controversial 
upshots. Analysis of America’s superpower 
status falls outside the purview of the present 
study, but it may be worth knowing whether and 
to what extent a relationship exists between MD 
and the USA’s claimed right to preemptive strike 
as one of the canons of America’s national 
strategy (in previous versions and, even more 
emphatically, in its most recent incarnation 
dated March 16, 2006), potential offensive 
measures, direction of American armament, 
including its nuclear arsenal, the principle of 
deterrence, efficacy of the non-proliferation 
regime, American attitudes towards remaining 
actors (state and institutional) on the 
international security scene, especially Russia 
and China, and to its own, and its allies’ 
interventionism. Professor Roman Kuźniar, 
director of Warsaw University’s Department of 
Strategic Studies, has observed that “there 
appears the question of absolute security of the 
sole superpower, which may lead to the sense 
of impunity (‘whatever I do, no one will be able 
to punish me’), as lucidly illustrated by the war in 
Iraq, based as it was on faulty premises.”14 
Does the USA’s and Poland’s broad aim of 
combating international terrorism suffice to 
balance any potential losses resulting from 
Polish support for the American venture? 
An important element that needs to be 
considered when analysing the possibility of 
accepting MD elements on its territory is 
Poland’s continued involvement in various 
international initiatives aimed at halting 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
such as the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) or the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) inspired by the American president, as 
well as myriad other forms of international 
cooperation. In this respect, acquiescence in the 
deployment of MD may be regarded as an 
extension of the WMD non-proliferation drive. 
 
Value Added 
 
The question about value added for Polish 
security from installing an American facility on 
our territory thus appears to be essentially 
tantamount to the question about American 
involvement in matters of Polish security, were it 
to be breeched by some other state or non-state 
external entity. 
This outlook may suggest that Poland is not 
satisfied with the present and forecast state of 
NATO and other security related institutions, 
with the credibility of and readiness to stand by 
security guarantees enshrined in Article V of the 
                                                          
14 Gazeta Wyborcza, December 6, 2005. 
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Washington Treaty.15 Witold Waszczykowski, 
undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Poland’s chief negotiator, noted that 
“dreams of the post cold war peace dividend 
were dashed as early as in the 1990s. We are 
dealing with a renationalisation of certain 
countries’ foreign and security policy, frequently 
even within the transatlantic community. There 
exist evident examples of renouncing the 
principle of transatlantic and European 
solidarity, even among EU member states, and 
thus we could in fact be justified in our anxiety  
that institutions we belong to which should guard 
us against security threats may fail authentically 
to implement the security mechanism. We also 
see certain organizations of which Poland is a 
member as permitting situations whereby a 
peculiar sort of political correctness insists on a 
specific tone of conversation, or block 
discussion of certain international threats and 
the directions these may take... NATO has not 
updated its contingency plans for years. This 
means that Poland must remember about 
further strengthening the organization 
responsible for international security, at the 
same time bearing in mind that we may need to 
shore up the mechanisms we find flawed and 
which might not work.”16 
Polish subject literature17 and debates attended 
by politicians, parliamentarians and pundits 
(such as those hosted by Center for 
International Relations, Polish Institute for 
                                                          
15 Cf. Report from the “NATO and Article V” conference 
organized by the Center for International Relations on March 
8, 2007. 
http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/seminar/2007/Sprawozdanie_N
ato_Artyku%B3_v.pdf 
16 Cf. A statement by Witold Waszczykowski at the 
“American antimissile shield and Polish national interest” 
conference organized by the Batory Foundation on August 
7, 2006. http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/tarcza-
antyrakietowa.pdf.  
17 See references in the present text. 
International Affairs, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Euro-Atlantic Association) provide 
numerous examples of assertions and allusions 
evincing a similar take on the problem, in other 
words assessment of the antimissile shield 
project not only as important with regard to 
American interests and the war on terror, but 
also  as “supplementing” the security 
guarantees the West has pledged to Poland in 
the face of an as yet unspecified but real threat 
to our country (purportedly) from the east. (One 
problem for Polish security policy is that our 
threat perceptions differ from those of many 
western states.) 
Siting one element of the antimissile shield, 
necessarily accompanied by stationing 
American personnel (probably around 300 
soldiers) and building the requisite military 
infrastructure in a given area would not just 
involve the USA in Poland or Czech Republic 
but, more broadly, in Central Europe (compared 
with progressive reduction in the number of 
“traditional” bases in Western Europe). 
This ought to suit Poland, given two things. First, 
American military and political involvement in 
Europe needs to continue, albeit according to a 
modified formula. One of the hallmarks of Polish 
security policy after 1989 is the sustained 
interest in American presence on our continent, 
regarded as a stabilizing force in our closest 
vicinity. At this juncture, however, it needs to be 
said that this postulate has hitherto appeared 
only in the context of American presence in 
Western Europe, for obvious reasons. Now, 
paradoxically, doubts are being voiced that 
installing MD elements may place Poland at risk 
of a retaliatory strike, while at the same time the 
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deployment of NATO infrastructure is perceived 
as an additional security guarantee. 
 
In black and white 
 
Thus it may be apt to ask whether increased 
American involvement in Polish security if 
Poland were to consent to the deployment of an 
MD component could be set in stone, since for 
some time now (beginning with the Iraq venture) 
the USA has been perceived as the country’s 
ultimate protector, albeit without any formally 
binding obligations? 
Any agreement with the United States ought to 
comprehensively secure Poland’s political, 
military and economic interests. This means 
that—optimally—the agreement should make 
references to American engagement in Polish 
security, guarantee that the entire enterprise is 
transparent to the Polish authorities, clearly 
delineate the remit of US and Polish jurisdiction 
paying heed to the Polish legal system and 
NATO’s SOFA regulations,18 determine how the 
Americans plan to finance the base itself and 
what are their plans as regards the local 
infrastructure. 
It may be largely up to Poland whether or not 
the agreement with the USA remains just a 
“modest” legal-technical document, limited to the 
narrowly construed domain of military 
cooperation, or becomes a significant treaty with 
clear political overtones. Were collaboration with 
the United States presented to Poles19 and our 
                                                          
18 ibid. 
19 According to various studies over 50 percent of Poles 
oppose the Shield. Cf. results of Polish opinion polls on the 
topic of deploying elements of the antimissile shield in our 
country, available from CIR: 
http://www.csm.org.pl/images/rte/File/Raporty%20i%20publi
kacje/Inne/Poland%20Missile%20Defense%20Study.ppt. 
The poll was commissioned by Missile Defence Advocacy 
allies in too unconvincing a manner, to many it 
may well become a virtue in itself obscuring the 
necessary weighing of Poland’s own interests in 
security and defence policy. 
In return for consenting to MD deployment, 
Poland would like such a broad agreement on 
political and military cooperation which would 
envisage a transfer of installations directly 
contributing to Polish security, and not solely 
that of the American base. The following options 
are being floated: 
‐ deployment in Poland20 of NATO’s Allied 
Ground Surveillance (AGS) base,21 
which requires American approval; 
‐ deployment of over a dozen air defence 
systems for short- and midrange rockets 
fired from relatively close by, e.g. mobile 
“Patriot” batteries (PAC-III) capable of 
taking out hostile missiles in re-entry 
stage, to defend the most crucial sites 
and troops on foreign missions; 
‐ in future, deployment of longer range 
mobile THAAD systems for short- and 
midrange rockets coming in from the 
east. 
 
The local community is particularly concerned 
about how the antimissile base (approx. 300 
hectares), with its attendant infrastructure, will 
affect the region’s economy, but also about its 
possible environmental impact. The greatest 
political hurdle may prove to be the matter of the 
so-called exterritoriality, though a US 
representative seems to have suggested that 
this issue had already been resolved, with the 
                                                                                       
Alliance, an American nongovernmental organization 
(http://www.missiledefenceadvocacy.org).  
20 In Powidz, close to Poznań. 
21 Cf. minutes from the Euro-Atlantic Association conference 
available at http://www.sea-ngo.org.  
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United States accepting that the area remain 
under Polish jurisdiction.22 Similarly, Americans 
appear to have agreed to finance the 
construction and maintenance of the base. The 
legal minutiae are to be elaborated in a number 
of agreements, including NATO’s tried-and-
tested Standing of Forces Agreement (SOFA).23 
One of the more interesting aspects is certainly 
the ultimate decision-making procedure for 
launching the antimissiles. Not just political 
factors, but also the need for immediate reaction 
to threats the MD system is set to counter (with 
reaction times of 2-12 minutes) may mean that 
direct command remains wholly in American 
hands, though a Polish-American liaison team 
may be put in place. 
 
Poland in crosshairs? 
 
Despite advanced stages of negotiations one 
question persists: is the antimissile shield the 
best guarantee for a binding American 
engagement in Polish security, since its very 
existence might in fact provoke a potential 
enemy to undertake offensive actions? Another 
is whether Poland—as an ally who accepts 
American presence on its territory—is going to 
be drawn into conflict with a state or states, for 
instance Iran, disposing of rockets which the MD 
system is designed to deal with and at the same 
time hostile towards Iraq, where Poland is part 
of the stabilization forces. 
Political and military risk, even of the direct sort, 
linked to the deployment doubtless exists. Any 
important military installation may be seen as a 
provocation. Any country on whose territory 
                                                          
22 In a statement by Daniel Fried, State Department official 
responsible for Central European relations, for TVN24 on 
September 9, 2007. 
such venture takes place, and all its citizens are 
exposed to the threat of attack. General 
Bolesław Balcerowicz, a renowned strategist, 
opined that “Polish participation in the 
antimissile shield project shall not have any 
direct bearing on our security—which will be 
indirectly strengthened by the closer ties to the 
United States, but which will also make Poland a 
target.”24 He does not regard the shield as a 
global defence system, but as one with a 
specific master and a particular area to protect 
that does not necessarily cover Poland and 
Europe. Such risk is augmented further 
wherever American installations are involved, 
given may organizations’ and milieus’ hostility or 
even overt hatred towards the superpower. 
Many analysts’ suggestions of high likelihood of 
terrorist attack linked to the construction of an 
American military facility in Poland is not without 
justification. However, the magnitude of risk 
appears lower when considering American 
bases in NATO countries in Europe or other US 
allies elsewhere in the world, principally in 
Japan, where they are protected by ancillary 
systems, than in the case of temporary military 
installations accompanying a military 
intervention, such as those in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. American bases in Europe, 
established after the Second World War, have 
never been targeted. Any US base in Poland 
would be exceedingly well protected and—
essentially—would be subject to agreement with 
Polish authorities. Meanwhile, a risk certainly 
exists of a terrorist attack against Poland, not so 
much due to the presence of an American 
installation, but as a consequence of the 
country’s pro-American stance evinced inter alia 
                                                                                       
23 http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?strona=pl_nato_sofa-pdp 
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by the very consent to its construction. As such, 
Poland certainly belongs to the “risk group”. 
Analysis of terrorist strikes in countries 
participating in the American-lead coalition 
implies that Poland is its sole important member 
to have thus far avoided attack. 
 
Russian criticism 
 
Plans to dislocate the MD component on Polish 
territory carry with them the risk connected with 
America’s fraught relationship with Russia, and 
tensions between Russia and Poland, though 
the latter rapport differs qualitatively from the 
former. 
Washington and Moscow will inexorably find a 
shared modus vivendi. Moscow would probably 
retract its manifest objections to MD’s 
deployment in Poland (and Czech Republic) on 
the condition that this would proceed in a 
manner that is “transparent” to the Russians. 
This could mean Russia’s receiving certain 
information pertaining to the system’s purpose , 
its role in future US defence strategy, the base 
itself and its attendant military infrastructure and, 
to a certain extent, missile launch procedures. It 
might even involve actual Russian inspection of 
the facility. Such a hypothesis was lent currency 
last year.25 
What appears to be another step towards a US-
Russia agreement is America’s provisional 
agreement to incorporate a post-soviet base in 
Azerbaijan into the MD system, which would 
permit Russia, which is in the process of 
                                                                                       
24 PAP, November 14, 2004. 
25 More precisely, since Sergei Ivanov, the Russian 
Federation’s defence minister, paid a visit to Donald 
Rumsfled, the then American defence secretary, on August 
28, 2006, followed by Russian foreign minister Sergei 
Lavrov’s visit to Warsaw on October 4-5, 2006, when the 
Russians were promised transparency in this domain. 
refurbishing its anti-ballistic missile defences, to 
participate in America’s global system.26 
American-Russian MD consultations may even 
constitute a mutually desirable starting point for 
dialogue on arms control in the new international 
security environment. This notion is 
corroborated by the double track nature of the 
Russian stance. On the one hand, there are 
enunciations about “adequate measures” Russia 
will take in response, i.e. threatening to withdraw 
from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
(which would pose to challenge above all to 
Europe),27 hinting at possible revision of 
Russian approach to the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which reduces the 
number of short- and midrange missiles in 
Europe, moving missile launch platforms closer 
to the Polish border (in the Kaliningrad district), 
installing RS-24 (“Iskander”) intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, or even instigating a new arms 
race.28 Such declarations, coming from 
president Vladimir Putin himself, foreign and 
defence ministers, Russia’s military 
establishment, especially Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief 
of General Staff, and influential 
parliamentarians, such as Konstantin Kosachev, 
chairman of Duma’s Committee for International 
Affairs, are founded on the assumption that the 
American system in Poland (and Czech 
Republic) will also target Russia. Russian 
                                                          
26 On June 7, 2007 in Heiligendam President Putin 
presented George Bush with the offer to utilize the Russian-
leased Gabala radar base, located some 180 km from 
Iranian border, instead of building one in Czech Republic, 
and to deploy antimissiles in Turkey or Iraq rather than in 
Poland. 
27 “Russia suspends Participation in Key Arms Treaty”, July 
14, 2007, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/07/m
il-070714-rferl01.htm 
28 At the same time, another idea was propounded to use 
intermediate range missiles eliminated by the INF accord for 
precision preventive strikes, as also discussed by American 
and Russian defence ministers on August 28, 2006. 
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analyses and statements suggest that ballistic 
missiles launched from such a site could hit 
targets in Russia’s European regions, making 
Europe America’s new frontier. 
One weighty counterargument Moscow invokes 
against the planned MD deployment is that the 
USA would thus breach the extant arms control 
regime and hamper international efforts to 
cooperate on antimissile defence. America’s 
withdrawal in mid 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty, signed in 1972 and essential in 
maintaining the strategic balance between the 
two superpowers during the cold war and in the 
years following its end, has for some time been 
viewed in Moscow as the first step towards 
expanding the US antimissile system and 
attaining strategic advantage over Russia. It 
appears that Russian objections are not actually 
aimed at the MD system as such, but rather 
constitute an expression of anxiety over 
Russia’s ever diminishing role on the global 
arena, for obvious reasons passing over the 
modernization of Russian missile potential.29 
On the other hand, however, every threat 
uttered by Russia is accompanied by a 
conciliatory offer of cooperation with the 
Americans (though not with Poles), in general 
implying room for compromise. This will 
probably be the case with the antimissile 
defence, but it may also encompass other 
spheres of security policy in the nascent network 
of future international relations, in particular 
those involving the USA, Russia, China, India 
and other Far East countries. 
All the while, Russia’s negative reactions to the 
planned MD deployment is directed at Poland 
(and Czech Republic) and may well escalate, 
                                                          
29 SS-24 rockets to replace SS-18s and SS-19s.  
shifting to extramilitary domains—though here 
rhetoric must always be distinguished from 
actual politics. 
Russia is traditionally opposed to foreign military 
infrastructure being deployed near its borders, 
or those of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, with the history of NATO enlargement to 
include Poland, Czech Republic,  Hungary and 
the Baltic States providing ample evidence of 
such reactions. With time Russian objections 
disappeared and Russia began to cooperate 
with the Atlantic Alliance. Przemysław 
Grudziński, military expert and Poland’s 
erstwhile ambassador to Washington, was right 
in saying that “it was Russian resistance to 
NATO enlargement that caused the Alliance to 
declare in 1999 that it is not planning to build 
any bases or station NATO troops on Czech, 
Hungarian or Polish territory. Although in the 
case of MDI the base would be American, and 
not NATO’s, but to Russian eyes this would 
constitute not circumventing that declaration but 
its outright breach. Still, a long time has passed 
since the statement was made. Yevgeny 
Primakov, the then Russian foreign minister, 
thought Poland joining NATO as crossing the 
line. Later this line came to be identified with the 
Baltic States’ accession to the Alliance. The 
Kremlin would probably view constructing MDI in 
Poland as yet again taking one step too many, 
though the line no longer seems quite as 
sharp.”30 
The plan to deploy an element of MD in Poland 
may incessantly be treated as a pretext to lay on 
our country the blame for stagnating Polish-
Russian relations and stoking anti-Russian 
psychosis. The shield deployment issue may 
                                                          
30 In an interview for Gazeta Wyborcza (November 2005). 
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possibly delay the Russian decision to continue 
high level political talks. Those involving foreign 
ministers (which took place and are set to 
resume) seem to have been deferred until future 
policy towards the USA is elaborated, while 
those between defence ministers are yet to 
commence. Deepening the political crisis in 
relations with Moscow is not in Poland’s 
interest—either for bilateral reasons, or in view 
of the situation whereby permanent conflict 
gives rise to a clear disproportion between the 
state of Russia’s relations with the west as a 
whole, and the USA in particular, and that of our 
bilateral relations. 
Several questions emerge in Polish public 
debate. To what extent ought the shield issue to 
be perceived simply as an element of the 
rapport between the MD system’s true master, 
i.e. the United States, and to what extent does 
should it impact Polish-Russian relations. This 
ineluctable dilemma is another reason why 
Poland should regard the antimissile system in 
the broader context of transatlantic and 
European security. 
 
In concert with allies 
 
The MD system, brainchild of the USA, 
indubitably NATO’s most important member, is 
being constructed outside of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. From a formal legal perspective the 
putative Polish-American military and political 
agreement will be bilateral. 
This assumption, adopted at the very outset of 
consultations between the United States and 
Poland over the missile shield, should not 
undermine the sense of America’s and Poland’s 
relations with NATO as a bloc, which in practice 
comes down to the two countries rapport with 
NATO’s European members—this  would not be 
in either party’s interest. Yet it did—the shield 
issue initially provoked a serious conflict 
between Washington and Brussels, while Polish 
government’s anticipated consent to the 
construction of the interceptor missile base (and 
Czechs’ espousal of the radar base idea) met 
with disapproval. Jaap de Hoop Schepper, 
NATO secretary general, criticized the American 
project for damaging fundamental principles of 
NATO as an organization for mutual defence, 
one of the preeminent aspects of the North 
Atlantic Alliance’s raison d’etre. 
For Poland one weighty argument in favour of 
forging links with the American system—besides 
the political premises (mentioned in part one of 
the present analysis)—was the American 
proposal’s technological and conceptual lead 
over its NATO equivalent. While the shape of 
MD has already been defined, NATO is only 
now producing analyses whether and to what 
extent an antimissile system to protect not just 
troops but also (or above all) allied territories, 
could be implemented. In late 2006, after four 
years’ worth of work on the so-called Feasibility 
Study, NATO decided that the antimissile 
system is “feasible”.31 Progress on analyses of 
political and military consequences for NATO of 
antimissile defence and the Alliance’s 
preparedness to construct the system may be 
ready for assessment at the NATO summit in 
Bucharest in February 2008 at the earliest. Still, 
precisely for reasons of security policy (security 
guarantees, economic and technical support) 
Poland ought to actively advocate far reaching 
cooperation between the USA and NATO on 
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matters of missile defence. Throughout the 
negotiations it should adopt the policy of 
“covering fire”, simultaneously striving to enliven 
NATO and EU activities in various domains and 
to inform its European partners about progress 
of the American venture to the extent that 
Poland is involved. For a long time it has failed 
to do so, despite experts’ suggestions. 
“Although the United States is Poland’s most 
important ally, it is not the only one. Strong 
security ties also bind us with European states 
(through NATO and the EU’s nascent security 
and defence policy). Poland should by no 
means hope for the weakening or relaxing these 
relation, which is why any deliberations on 
potential Polish involvement in MD should take 
into account this broad European perspective. 
What does this mean in practice? When 
negotiating with Americans Poland should first 
and foremost insist that the shield acquire 
“allied” character,” wrote Beata Górka-Winter, to 
name but one analyst.32 
Polish response came tardily and could be 
treated as derivative of the USA’s 
rapprochement with NATO over the antimissile 
system. For Washington has begun clearly to 
underscore that the shield’s European pillar, to 
wit the installations in Poland and Czech 
Republic, is not only to defend the United States 
but also these two countries,33 as well as other 
Central European states, Germany, Baltic 
States and even northern Russia. Other 
countries most exposed to possible attacks 
(Italy, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Ukraine and Moldova) ought to be 
                                                                                       
31 Riga NATO Summit Final Declaration, pt. 25, November 
29, 2006. 
32 Rzeczpospolita, February 27, 2006. 
protected by NATO’s short and intermediate 
range missiles.34 As a result of the Americans’ 
admittedly consistent policy NATO American 
system, accepting that the USA should proceed 
with building the shield.35 
Poland ultimately put forward the issue of linking 
the shield with NATO defence planning. 
Although most EU member states do not want 
MD components to be deployed on our 
continent, they are not opposed to the idea of a 
missile defence system.  Several groups of 
states are tracking ballistic missile movements 
in partnership with the United States. Close 
American allies include the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, which remains outside the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy, largely due 
to the benefits it reaps from close cooperation 
with the superpower, and Norway, which is not 
in fact an EU member. In view of Poland’s good 
political relations and military cooperation with 
these countries, it is worthwhile to learn from 
their experiences, both military and those 
                                                                                       
33 Cf. Statement by the chief of the Missile Defence Agency 
at the CIR conference in Warsaw on April 18, 2007, at 
www.csm.org.pl.  
34 Both the United States and NATO have declared the 
desire to defend allied forces deployed on missions outside 
NATO’s treaty area against rocket attacks. Having 
concluded that MD remains an illusory solution where 
defence of contingents is concerned, given its ability to shoot 
down enemy missiles only in the middle stage of flight when 
there is most time to react, a pundit at a military weekly 
posed the following question: “should we be vying for a 
weapon that will prove redundant for a decade or two in a 
situation where we are unable to provide our contingents 
with antimissile defence?” (Artur Goławski “Strategiczny 
dylemat”, Polska Zbrojna, 47/2005). He goes on to ask: 
“Perhaps we should not enter Uncle Sam’s strategic system, 
but wait instead for NATO’s operational-tactical ALTBMD 
(Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence), which is 
set to protect troops on foreign missions against short and 
midrange missile threats around 2010? Joining ALTBMD 
would have the advantage of not antagonizing our NATO 
allies.” In essence, ALTBMD boils down to creating a system 
that would integrate extant air defence systems, actually 
constructed in cooperation with major NATO powers. Poland 
is not at present participating in this venture. 
35 At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, on April 
19, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
pertaining to legal regulations, underlying their 
partnership with the United States. 
Therefore, the problem (in this and many other 
domains of EU policy) does not come down to 
America’s stark unilateralism, putatively contrary 
to European interests. No less of a worry is the 
continued lack of a European policy that would 
permit the implementation of effective projects 
(which is not to say ones identical to what the 
USA is suggesting). This means that the 
European Union is not, at least for now, about to 
reach a consensus on issues such as shielding 
Europe’s territory and does not possess the 
technology which would allow the realization of 
large programmes of this type. Were one to 
assume, as we have done in the introduction, 
that antimissile defence is set to remain one of 
the key topics in global security policy, then the 
EU, if it wants to undertake joint efforts in this 
domain, will need to decide whether it will strive 
to construct its own (autonomous?) system or 
work in tandem with the United States. 
Antimissile defence is becoming one of the most 
important themes in transatlantic relations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To recap, it appears that: 
 
1. In deciding whether to allow the 
deployment of an element of the 
American antimissile shield in our 
country important role shall be played 
by specifically Polish thinking in 
geopolitical terms and the wish to 
secure additional protection against 
potential threats (independent of NATO 
guarantees). 
2. In consenting to the deployment of an 
MD component Poland would be 
making a strategic choice, not just given 
the nature of the planned installation, 
which is to serve the universal purpose 
of contemporary security policy, i.e. 
countering rocket attacks by terrorist 
groups, but above all because of the 
repercussions ensuing from tying its 
security with that of the USA. Poland 
has always based its security interests 
on cooperation with the United States 
and the latter’s presence in Europe. 
Present and future cooperation with the 
USA will determine whether or not 
Poland will ultimately accept the 
American project, given of course that 
the United States will ultimately decide 
to deploy the MD element in our 
country. 
3. Because of the MD system’s relevance 
and the United States’ role in the broad 
international situation over many years 
to come, cooperating with the USA 
would doubtless entail long term 
positive and negative consequences for 
our country’s security and defence. 
Thus there is no unequivocal answer to 
the question of whether constructing a 
MD element on Polish territory is 
justified, and especially whether it is in 
Poland’s security interests. However, 
neither is there a better guarantee to 
secure ourselves against a possible 
strike. For years Poland has conducted 
a policy aimed at non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
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4. In view of the above, and despite 
numerous unknowns and reservations 
stemming from the MD project in its 
political and military dimensions, Poland 
ought to lean towards participation in 
the American project, on favourable 
conditions. Policy oriented towards 
cooperation with the USA need not 
mean unconditional agreement to the 
deployment and this provides room for 
manoeuvre in talks with the United 
States. 
5. Locating a component of the American 
system should above all provide value 
added to the current (or foreseeable) 
state of Polish security. Agreement with 
the USA ought to secure Polish political, 
military and economic interests in as 
broad a manner as possible. This 
means that optimally the agreement 
should contain references to American 
involvement in Polish security, 
guarantee a high degree of 
transparency of the entire venture to the 
Polish authorities, clearly delineate the 
remit of US and Polish jurisdiction, 
paying heed to the Polish legal 
framework and NATO’s SOFA 
regulations, and provide for an 
advantageous division of the financial 
burden of constructing and maintaining 
the base and its attendant infrastructure. 
In the name of what is seen as the 
greater good (US security guarantees) 
will not make onerous demands, though 
this may elicit censure from large 
swathes of the society. 
NATO’s embryonic antimissile defence 
programme does not represent a viable 
alternative for Poland, which should nonetheless 
actively support increased collaboration with 
NATO as a whole, speak out in favour of US-
NATO partnership and shore up the European 
Union in its efforts to construct a common 
foreign, security and defence policy.
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